Recently coded caching has emerged as a promising means to handle continuously increasing wireless traffic. However, coded caching requires users to cooperate in order to minimize the overall transmission rate. How users with heterogeneous preferences cooperate in coded caching and how to calculate the resulting caching gains are still open problems. In this paper, a two-phase cache-aided network is investigated, in which users with heterogeneous preferences are served by a base station through a shared link. Effective throughput is considered as a performance metric. It is proved that the achievable domain of effective throughputs is a convex set and can be characterized by its boundary. A special type of caching schemes, named uncoded placement absolutely-fair (UPAF) caching, is studied.
for overloaded multi-input single-output channels [17] . The work [18] provided a coded caching scheme for multiple-server networks. An order-optimal coded caching scheme was proposed to meet users' privacy requirement in [19] .
In present multimedia applications, a few popular content items typically account for the majority of network traffic [20] . User preferences on these popular content items have been shown to play a critical role in designing caching schemes [21] . Various caching schemes were developed to improve network capability by taking advantage of content popularity [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . The work [22] proposed femtocaching to reduce downloading delay according to network topology and popularity distributions. A file grouping scheme was developed to handle the uneven preferences in cache-aided networks [23] . For content items with discrete popularities, [24] proposed a nearoptimal coded caching scheme to reduce network load. The memory-rate tradeoff for coded caching under uneven popularities was revealed in [25] and [26] . Game theoretic techniques were also adopted to design caching and pricing strategies [27] - [28] .
In previous studies, the focus has been on improving network performance for the sake of servers. For example, [13] - [14] devoted to reduce the load that the server sustains and [29] tried to lower the overall energy consumption. Less attention has been paid to the revenue that an individual user can obtain from caching. Thanks to the progress of big data technologies, user preferences can be analyzed based on private browsing history and social relationships [30] - [31] .
Existing studies have mostly ignored users' personal differences by assuming that all the users have the same probability of requesting a content item [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . However, user preferences have a significant impact on caching gains. If a user is interested in only a few content items, i.e., the user requests are deterministic or near-deterministic, this user's buffer can be filled with these content items. This user can find the desired content items directly when it issues requests. As a result, this user obtains a high effective throughput from caching. If a user is interested in many content items, the above mechanism does not work due to the buffer size constraint. It can cooperate with other users by coded caching to split the transmission cost. Few works have focused on how to calculate each user's caching gain in this case.
In this paper, we investigate effective throughput from caching for users with heterogeneous preferences. More specifically, multiple users are served by a base station through a shared link and user preferences are characterized by a probability measure. Similar to the model considered in [13] and [14] , the network works in two phases, a placement phase and a delivery phase.
In the placement phase, network load is light and user buffers are filled through idle spectra.
In the delivery phase, user requests are revealed and the base station transmits messages to help the users recover the desired content items. Effective throughput is used as a performance metric, which indicates the reduction in the transmission cost in the delivery phase. Each user's effective throughput is calculated individually. To characterize the whole achievable domain of effective throughputs, we need to investigate all the feasible placement and delivery policies, which is however of prohibitive complexity. Upon that, we prove the convexity of the achievable domain and focus on a special type of policies, termed uncoded placement absolutely-fair (UPAF) policies. The achievable domain under UPAF policies is shown to be a polygon in the two-user case.
The higher the effective throughput a user obtains, the lower the real-time transmission cost this user affords. If the users are selfish and each user wishes to maximize its own effective throughput, the users form a game relationship. Based on the analysis on achievable domain in the two-user case, a noncooperative game is formulated to investigate the effective throughput equilibrium between the two users. In addition, a cooperative game is studied to allocate the revenue of cooperation, which helps in designing pricing policies. Suffering from the hardness in finding a Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games, a low-complexity numerical algorithm is proposed to give a reasonable revenue allocation for the two users. An algorithm is also presented to organize user cooperation in the general multiuser case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model and the formal definition of placement and delivery policies. Section III proves the convexity of the achievable domain of effective throughputs and investigates the achievable domain for the twouser case in detail. Games among two users are studied in Section IV. Section V presents a cooperation scheme for the general multiuser case. Simulation results are given in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII concludes this paper and suggests some directions for future research.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We introduce the system model in Subsection II-A, provide the definition of effective throughput in Subsection II-B, and then present an example to illustrate the research motivation in Subsection II-C.
A. System Model
Consider a Base Station (BS) connected with K users through a shared error-free link. The BS has access to a database of N content items, denoted by W 1 , . . . , W N . Assume that all the content items have an identical size of F bits. Let Ω = {W n : n ∈ [N ]} denote the collection of bits of the content items. 1 User k is equipped with a buffer of b k F bits, or equivalently,
user k asks for content item W n , i.e., d k,n = 1 if user k asks for W n and d k,n = 0 otherwise.
We refer to D = (d k,n ) K×N as the demand matrix, which is a random matrix with support set {0, 1} K×N . Then user preferences can be characterized by a probability measure on D, denoted as P. In practice, user preferences can be analyzed based on private browsing history and social relationships [30] - [31] . The probability that user k requests W n is given by p k,n = P({D : This cache-aided network operates in two phases, namely a placement phase and a delivery phase. In the placement phase, user requests are not specific. The users prefetch data from the BS and cache them in their buffers with the knowledge of the probability measure P. In the delivery phase, the users issue requests for the content items. The demand matrix D reduces to a deterministic matrixD = (d k,n ) K×N . Local buffers provide useful information in recovering the requested content items. The users probably also need to turn to the BS in order to recover all the requested content items. The network described above is referred to as (B, N, P)-Caching.
B. Formal Problem Statement
We provide a formal description of placement and delivery policies for (B, N, P)-Caching. 
Definition 1. A placement and delivery policy
Due to the buffer size constraint,
In the delivery phase, user requests are revealed and henceD is known. For each subset
The message M U is generated to help users in U recover the requested content items.
iii) Content recovering function (π r k ) k∈ [K] : After receiving the transmitted messages, each user attempts to recover the requested content items by π r k , i.e.,
whereD k = {n :d k,n = 1} represents the set of content items requested by user k.
3Ŵ k n stands for the estimated W n .
For a placement and delivery policy π, the error probability is defined as
where Pr{·|·} denotes the conditional probability. Given a (B, N, P)-Caching, there are numerous placement and delivery policies that can satisfy the user requests. A traditional one is just to ignore user buffers and transmit the requested content items in the delivery phase directly.
Caching and multicasting enable us to satisfy user requests in a more effective manner. For a policy π, we define the effective throughput of user k as
2 For a set S, |S| denotes its cardinality.
where E D (·) denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to the random matrix D. The . Thus, the effective throughput defined in Eq. (5) represents the reduction in the transmission cost of user k.
The summation of all users' effective throughputs has
Note
represent the expected number of content items requested by the users and the total number of bits transmitted by the BS, respectively.
The right-hand side of Eq. (6) indicates the reduction in the number of the bits transmitted by the BS due to caching and multicasting (normalized by the content size F ). Thus, R k indicates the revenue of user k from caching. As caching schemes studied in previous literatures like [13] [14] [15] [16] , the proposed policies may incur a high signaling overhead. This overhead can be partly eliminated by large content items.
Users' effective throughputs vary with policies. All the possible values of effective throughputs form an achievable domain.
is achievable if for every ε > 0 and every sufficiently large F there exists a policy π = π(ε, F ) that achieves (R k ) k∈ [K] with error probability lower than ε.
For a (B, N, P)-Caching, the achievable domain of effective throughputs is defined as
If no confusion arises, we simply denote R(B, N, P) by R. The achievable domain R depends on the buffer size vector, the number of content items, as well as user preferences.
C. A Motivating Example
In this subsection, we present a demo to illustrate the research motivation and the impact of user preferences on effective throughputs. As shown in Fig. 1 , two users are interested in two content items, denoted as A and B. Each user at most caches one content item. User 1 requests the two content items with probability 99% and 1%, respectively. User 2 requests the two content items with an identical probability, 50%. In this demo, we assume each user requests only one content item. The coded caching scheme suggests to divide each content item into two portions and then the user requests can always be satisfied by transmitting a coded packet of size 0.5 [13] . Then both the two users achieve an effective throughput 0.75. The coded caching scheme requires the two users cooperate in both the two phases. Let us consider a noncooperation scheme that each user caches the most popular content items. The two users split the transmission costs if the delivered data are useful for both the two users. It is seen that user 1 achieves a much higher effective throughput in the noncooperation scheme than it does in coded caching. As a result, user preferences have a significant impact on caching gains and should be taken into account in cache-aided networks.
III. PROPERTY OF THE ACHIEVABLE DOMAIN
In this section, we prove the convexity of the achievable domain of effective throughputs and then focus on a special type of placement and delivery policies, termed UPAF policies. It will be shown that (B, N, P)-Caching with two users has an achievable domain as a polygon under UPAF policies.
A. Convexity of the Achievable Domain
The following theorem presents the convexity of the achievable domain of effective throughputs . Theorem 1. For any (B, N, P)-Caching, the achievable domain R is a convex set and for any
be two points in R, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . To prove the convexity, we only need to show that (αR
with error probability lower than ε. We divide each content item into two portions, containing αF bits and (1 − α)F bits respectively. By further dividing each buffer into two portions of size αb k F bits and (1 − α)b k F bits, the original (B, N, P)-Caching can be viewed as two (B, N, P)-Caching with different content sizes. The policies π 1 and π 2 can be respectively applied in the two (B, N, P)-Caching. The error probability is bounded by
The effective throughput of user k is given by
where M 1 U and M 2 U are messages generated by π 1 and π 2 respectively. For any α ∈ (0, 1), (αR
can be achieved by combining π 1 and π 2 for sufficiently large F .
Hence, R is a convex set.
Eq. (8) implies that if a point
∈ R with error probability lower than ε. In the delivery phase, π(ε, F ) transmits M {k} to user user k exclusively. Let us consider a new policy in which the BS additionally transmits a random message of (R k − x k )F bits to user k. For this new policy, the error probability remains unchanged while the effective throughputs reduce to (x k ) k∈ [K] . Thus,
According to Theorem 1, we only need to pay attention to the boundary in the positive orthant in order to characterize R, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . In addition, we can have more insights on the achievable domain of (B, N, P)-Caching. The values of different users' effective throughputs are interchangeable. When a policy brings one user a high effective throughput, the other users may only obtain low effective throughputs.
It is intractable to investigate all the feasible policies and characterize the whole achievable domain of effective throughputs. In the paper, we focus on absolutely fair (AF) policies.
Definition 3.
A policy π is absolutely fair if each user in U can obtain the same amount of useful information from the message M U , i,e,
for k, j ∈ U. 
B. The Achievable Domain for (B, N, P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, we investigate the achievable domain of (B, N, P)-Caching with two users.
A policy π maps the content items and requests into the buffer states (C k ) k∈ [K] and the transmitted
to represent the policy π. To characterize R for the two-user case, we only need to study all feasible C 1 , C 2 , M {1} , M {2} , and
For a UPAF policy, we have C 1 , C 2 ⊆ Ω. Let us define
Then, X U stands for the bits exclusively cached in the buffer of user k for k ∈ U. It is seen that C 1 = X {1} ∪ X {1,2} and C 2 = X {2} ∪ X {1,2} . In the delivery phase, the demand matrix D is known. Then, user 1 and user 2 wish to recover the bits in Q 1 = {W n : n ∈D 1 } and
Then Y U is the set of bits requested only by users in U but not cached in the buffers of these users. As a result, users in U want to recover Y U from the transmitted messages. Fig. 3 illustrates the relations between X U and Y U .
To satisfy user requests in the delivery phase, we can simply set
and M {1,2} = Y {1,2} . Notice that user 1 contains a part of bits that user 2 requests and vice versa.
Index coding can be applied to create more multicasting opportunities and improve the effective throughputs of both user 1 and user 2 [32] . In this case, the transmission costs of user 1 and user 2 are given bȳ
Note that Eqs. (17) and (18) give the minimum transmission costs for given C 1 , C 2 , andD, because all the possible multicasting opportunities have been exploited.
The transmission costs, i.e., Eqs. (17) and (18), can also be represented as functions of the two users' buffer states. To this end, we denote X U ,n = X U ∩ W n . According to De Morgan's laws, Eqs. (14)- (16) can be rewritten as
Defining x U ,n = |X U ,n | F and substituting Eqs. (19)- (21) into Eqs. (17)- (18) yield
The variable x U ,n stands for how much X U ,n accounts for W n .
For fixed uncoded placement C 1 and C 2 , the maximum effective throughputs achieved by UPAF policies are given by
From the proof of Theorem 1, one can see that Theorem 1 also holds for UPAF policies. Thus, the boundary of the achievable domain under UPAF policies can be given by solving the following optimization problem:
The first constraint is due to the fact that the sets x U ,n are disjoint for U ⊆ {1, 2}. The second constraint forbids buffer overflows in the placement phase. By tuning α from 0 to 1, we obtain the boundary of the achievable domain of effective throughputs under UPAF policies.
Problem (26) is almost a linear programming (LP) problem except the minimizing operations. To simplify problem (26), we introduce auxiliary variables
x {2},n and vectors
Then x 1 and x 2 represent the proportion of each content item cached in user 1 and user 2, respectively. The vector x 3 represents the proportion of each content item cached in both the two users' buffers. The vector z is a function of x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 . The last element of z is a fixed constant 1, which is used to express the constant term in Eqs. (24)- (25) 
Then, problem (26) can be transformed into an equivalent LP problem
where
gives the effective throughput of user k and A i , B, as well as h result from the constraints in problem (26) Proof. To show the achievable domain under UPAF policies is a polygon, we only need to show its boundary is piecewise linear. The points in the boundary can be obtained by solving problem (33) . Notice that the constraints of problem (33) are linear and are independent of α. Therefore, the feasible domain of problem (33) remains unchanged with different values of α.
According to the LP theory, the feasible domain of an LP problem is a convex polytope and the optimal solution is a vertex of the convex polytope [33] . 6 Since the number of vertices of a convex polytope is finite, problem (33) at most achieves finitely many different optimal solutions when α goes from 0 to 1. As a result, the boundary can be characterized by finitely many points and therefore is piecewise linear. 
IV. GAMES IN (B, N, P)-CACHING WITH TWO USERS
In this section, a noncooperative game is formulated to investigate the equilibrium on effective throughputs for (B, N, P)-Caching with two users. Based on the noncooperative game, a cooperative game is studied to allocate the caching gains. Furthermore, a low-complexity algorithm is presented to provide a reasonable effective throughput allocation.
A. Noncooperative Game in (B, N, P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, we investigate a noncooperative game in (B, N, P)-Caching with two users.
More specifically, we assume that the two users fill their buffers individually in the placement phase. The BS satisfies the user requests in a manner that the number of transmitted bits is minimized. Each user wishes to maximize its own effective throughput from caching. It will be shown that the noncooperative game always has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE). In addition, the noncooperative game has pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) when the user preferences are similar.
In the noncooperative game, the two users take the roles of players. The sets of bits cached in the user buffers in the placement phase, i.e., C 1 and C 2 , act as strategies. Throughout this subsection, we consider only UPAF policies. As a result, the strategy sets for this two users are
given by
The payoffs for this two users are the effective throughputs resulting from caching and thus are presented in Eqs.
(24) and (25), respectively. We denote the above noncooperative game as
Nash's existence theorem guarantees that the noncooperative game in (B, N, P)-Caching with two users at least has a mixed NE [34] .
Theorem 3. G 0 has a mixed NE.
Proof. G 0 has finitely many players. In addition, the strategy sets are finite, i.e.,
Thus G 0 is a finite game. According to Nash's existence theorem, G 0 has a mixed NE.
A pure strategy is a bit-by-bit decision over the content items. However, a mixed NE needs not to divide a bit into smaller parts. Instead, a mixed NE chooses pure strategies according to a certain distribution. Having proved the existence of a mixed NE, we pay attention to PSNEs.
However, it is computationally prohibitive to find a PSNE and corresponding payoffs for G 0 , due to the fact that the strategy sets are of exponential sizes. To overcome that, we construct an infinite game based on G 0 .
Note that the strategies C 1 and C 2 can be completely characterized by x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 . The payoff functions in G 0 can be rewritten as
Let us consider a two-player infinite game
The strategy sets are feasible domains of x 1 and x 2 , i.e.,
where the constraint is equivalent to the one in problem (33) . One can see that problem (36) is also an LP problem. The basic idea to formulate G 1 is as follows. Each user decides the number of bits cached in its own buffer. Thus x 1 and x 2 act as strategies. When the values of x 1 and x 2 are selected, user 1 is granted the privilege to maximize its own effective throughput by adjusting the values of x 3 and z and then yields the payoff function f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ). Similarly, 
2 ) is a PSNE of G 1 . We have
The condition (36) has the same optimal solution (x * 3 , z * ) for both k = 1 and k = 2. Thus, we have
Let us consider (C * 1 , C * 2 ) satisfying
,n , and
Eqs. (39) and (40) can be written as
Lemma 1 reveals that G 0 has a PSNE if G 1 has a PSNE and the two users adopt the same pair values of x 3 and z. By applying Debreu's theorem [35] , we can prove that G 1 has a PSNE.
Lemma 2. G 1 has a PSNE.
Proof. According to Debreu's theorem, we only need to show that the strategy sets are nonempty convex compact subsets of an Euclidean space and the payoff functions are continuous and quaisconcave.
The sets E 1 and E 2 are bounded and closed in R N and thus are also compact. The payoff functions are maximums of a series of linear functions:
It is seen that f k (x 1 , x 2 ) is continuous. To prove the quais-concavity of f k (x 1 , x 2 ), we only need to show
T k z is quais-concave, according to the properties of quais-concavity. As a linear function,
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we have the following theorem. 
Problem (44) is also an LP problem. Let λ k denote the optimal solution of problem (44). Then the payoff functions can be written as
According to the LP theory, λ k is a step function with respect to x 1 and x 2 [33] . In other words, we have
almost everywhere.
) is a PSNE of G 1 . We require and only require
Substituting Eqs. (45)- (46) into Eqs. (47)- (48) yields
which are sufficient and necessary conditions for PSNEs. Since λ k is a step function of x 1 and x 2 , G 1 have more than one PSNE, which further certifies that G 0 has more than one PSNE.
Since the normal vectors of the hyperplanes are only related to the user preferences, Theorem 4 implies that G 0 has PSNEs when the two users' preferences are similar enough. The buffer size vector has no effect on the existence of PSNEs of G 0 . It is worth noting that Theorem 4
does not claim that G 0 has no PSNEs when the two users' preferences differ much. Instead, simulations demonstrate that G 0 has PSNEs at most cases.
Note that the proof of the existence of NE is nonconstructive. Now we pay attention to how to calculate a NE. Unfortunately, it have been proved that calculating a NE is PPAD-complete, which is a subclass of NP [37] . The exponential size of the strategy sets also implies the difficulty of finding a NE. Recall that the core condition that (x 1 , x 2 ) forms a PSNE is that the two users reach a consensus on the value of x 3 (z is a function of x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 ). Based on best response dynamics, we present Algorithm 1 to give a PSNE with high probability. The core idea behind Algorithm 1 is to update the two users' caching schemes, i.e., x 1 and x 2 , alternately. Once the caching schemes converge and the two users reach the the same x 3 in Steps 4 and 5, a PSNE is found and the program terminates. The parameter T is a positive integer that limits the maximum number of iterations.
Even though simulations reveal that Algorithm 1 can return a PSNE at most cases, it is likely that no PSNE is found when the program terminates. That might be because G 0 does not have a PSNE, a bad initialization point is chosen, the number of iterations is not large enough, or Maximize R 2 (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , z) for fixed x 1 = x * 1 and obtain the optimal solution x 2 = x * 2 and x 3 = x * 3 ;
5:
Maximize R 1 (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , z) for fixed x 2 = x * 2 and obtain the optimal solution x 1 = x * * 1 and x 3 = x * * 3 ;
6:
break;
8:
x * 1 = x * * 1 ;
10:
end if 11: end for
other reasons. There is a balance between the probability that Algorithm 1 finds a PSNE and the computational complexity. Higher T will increase the probability and computational complexity simultaneously.
Remark 1:
In order to construct G 0 , the two users and the BS should know the user preferences P. Once P is known and a NE is found, the two users will prefetch data according to the NE without communicating with each other.
B. Cooperative Game in (B, N, P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, a cooperative game in (B, N, P)-Caching with two users is investigated. A numerical algorithm is presented to find a PSNE for the two users. Then reasonable allocation schemes are proposed, which help in designing a pricing policy.
If the two users do not cooperate with each other and the BS serves each user individually, i.e., M U = ∅ for |U| ≥ 2, the optimal caching strategy should be caching the content items that a user requests with the highest probabilities. This scheme is referred to as pure caching. The effective throughput resulting from pure caching is given by
where p k,(n) is the n-th largest number among p k,1 , ..., p k,N . If the two users does not cooperate in the placement phase, the payoffs at a NE in the noncooperative game, denoted by R Let y = (y 1 , y 2 ) be an allocation scheme. All the allocation schemes that hold individual rationality and collective rationality form a core for the cooperative game C(B, N, P) = {y :
Generally, the core for a cooperative game is likely to be empty [36] . However, the following theorem reveals that C(B, N, P) is nonempty.
Theorem 5. C(B, N, P) is nonempty for any B, N , and P.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we only need to show R 2 ) ∈ R no matter the payoffs are achieved by a mixed NE or a PSNE. The effective throughput from cooperation is given by R c = max (y 1 ,y 2 )∈R (y 1 + y 2 ), which ensures that R
All the allocation schemes in C(B, N, P) are acceptable for rational users. In cooperative games, the satisfaction degree of a player on an allocation scheme is usually measured by the difference between the payoff resulting from noncooperative game and the allocation, i.e., R n k − y k . The lower the difference, the higher the degree of satisfaction. By maximizing the minimum satisfaction degrees among the two users, we reach an unique allocation scheme
which is usually referred to as the nucleolus in cooperative games and happens to be the Shapley values [38] . It is seen that R (53) and can be obtained by Algorithm 1 with high probability. For the case that no PSNE is found in Algorithm 1, we suggest to allocate the cooperation gain according to R p k . More specifically, the effective throughput is given by
Again, we have R to find the NEs of this noncooperative game due to its large scale and payoffs. As a result, an algorithm is presented to give a placement and delivery policy directly.
We consider uncoded placement processes in this section. Then the buffer states satisfy C k ⊆ Ω for k ∈ [K]. Again, the K users act as players. User k's strategy set is given by
k is selected and the demand matrix D is revealed, the BS applies index coding to minimize the total effective throughput.
The resulting effective throughput of user k is denoted by Instead of calculating a NE, we present a UPAF policy to organize user cooperation directly in the following. Let us denote
Then, X U denotes the set of bits cached exclusively in users in U. The demand matrixD is revealed in the delivery phase. The set of bits that user k wants to recover is given by
Then, Y U ,V stands for the set of bits requested only by users in U and cached only by users in V. One can see that the sets Y U ,V are disjoint for different U or V, and
In the delivery phase, the requests for the content items can be decomposed into requests for the sets Y U ,V . The BS needs to transmits messages to help the users recover Y U ,V . A rough UPAF policy is just to set
Notice that every user caches side information that others are interested in. Users can cooperate to obtain higher effective throughputs by index coding. We define
Then, Z U ,V is the set of bits requested only by users in U and at least cached by users in V. For
It can be verified that Eq. (58) ensures that
, because all the other bits have been cached in the buffers of users in U j . The transmission cost of one bit is
. To maximize the effective throughputs, we need to carefully group
A grouping method for Z U ,V is presented in Algorithm 3. The b k most popular content items are cached in the buffer of user k in the placement phase. 7 For each subset U ⊆ [K], we create a group of set pairs {(U j , U \ U j )} according to the demand matrixD. Each coded bit is generated by taking a bit from Z U j ,U \U j . In Steps 9 to 13, the sets Z U ,V are updated. If some bits cannot be recovered from the coded bits, these bits are added to M U in Steps 16 to 18. It is seen that Algorithm 3 is absolutely fair, because each user in U can recover H(M U ) bits from M U . 8 Since each user prefetches data individually in the placement phase, Algorithm 3 is decentralized.
Let R 3 k be the effective throughput of user k from Algorithm 3. We have the following theorem.
Proof. In Algorithm 3, users recover some bits from coded messages
The transmission cost of bits recovered from these messages is Split U into J disjoint subsets (U j ) j∈ [J] such that users in U j ask for the same content items, i.e., U k 1 and U k 2 are classified into the same subset ifD k 1 =D k 2 ;
7:
for j ∈ [J] do 10: for S ⊆ U \ U j do 11: 
18: end for
Theorem 6 indicates that Algorithm 3 provides a higher effective throughput for each user than pure caching does. Even though no NE is used in Algorithm 3, Algorithm 3 is fair if it is executed enough times and the user preferences are randomly generated each time. This is because one user may gain extra advantage one time and may also suffer losses next time. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the section, we present numerical results to validate the theoretical analysis and illustrate the effective throughput gains from user cooperation. In the simulations, we assume that each user independently requests one content item in the delivery phase. Therefore, the probability measure P can be fully characterized by the user preference matrix P . Throughout this section, we always assume that the users are equipped with buffers of identical sizes,
To validate the performance of the proposed algorithms, we compare them with pure caching.
In , ..., 1 20 . The three preference matrices are set to be
It is seen that UPAF policies always attain larger achievable domains than pure caching policies do, which demonstrates the potential of improving the effective throughput by user cooperation.
Corresponding to the analysis in Section III-B, the achievable domains under UPAF policies are polygons. When P = P 1 or P 3 , the achievable domains have reflectional symmetry. This is because user 1 and user 2 have the same preference distribution. When P = P 2 , the preference of user 2 is more concentrated. In this case, the achievable domain under P 2 loses the reflectional symmetry and user 2 can obtain higher maximum effective throughput than user 1 does.
In Fig. 5 , we present the achievable domain under UPAF policies for (B, N, P)-Caching with two users and different buffer sizes. The preference matrix is set to be P = P 2 . It is not surprising that the larger the buffer size, the larger the achievable domain. Again, the achievable domains under UPAF policies are polygons and user 2 obtain higher maximum effective throughput than user 1 does.
To illustrate the advantage of user cooperation, we consider a (B, N, P)-Caching with two users, where the number of content items and the buffer size are set to be N = 4 and B = 2.
The preference matrix is given by . Thus the parameter β describes the preference difference between the two users and how concentrated the user 1's preference is. Fig. 6 presents the effective throughput versus β. It can be seen that cooperative games always reach higher effective throughputs than noncooperative games and pure caching do. The effective throughput of user 1 increases with β, which validates again that more concentrated preferences helps to create higher effective throughputs. Under the setting in the simulation, user cooperation can even bring over 25% additional effective throughput. In contrast, effective throughput of user 2 decreases with β. That is because concentrated preference helps user 1 to dominate the game between the two users. Theorem 4 ensures that there exists a PSNE when β is small. In the simulations, Algorithm 1 always finds a PSNE for β varying from 0 to 1 (T and ε are set to be 100 and 10 −5 respectively). We also tested Algorithm 1 for different B, N, and randomly generated P . Algorithm 1 returned a PSNE with probability exceeding 90%. Simulations demonstrate that a PSNE exists on a scale greater than that Theorem 4 characterizes. The parameter β in the preference matrix P (β) is set to be β = 0.5. It is not surprising to see that the effective throughputs always increase with the buffer size. Again, user 1 dominates the games and always obtains a higher effective throughput than user 2 does. User cooperation can bring a considerable increase in effective throughput. When the buffer size is small, the gap between cooperative game and noncooperative game is small. That is because multicasting opportunities are few due to the lack of side information. When the buffer size tends to the number of content items, the gaps between cooperative game, noncooperative game, and pure caching shrink, because few data need to be transmitted in the delivery phase. For both Algorithm 3 and pure caching, the effective throughput increases with the buffer size.
Algorithm 3 always achieves a higher effective throughput than pure caching does. However, the gap between Algorithm 3 and pure caching shrinks with increasing the buffer size. That is because the effective throughput gain of Algorithm 3 mainly comes from multicasting for small buffer size. In Fig. 8 , user 1 always obtains a higher effective throughput than user 2 does, and user 2 always achieves a higher effective throughput than user 3 does. The more concentrated the preference, the higher effective throughput the user can obtain. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of heterogeneous user preferences on effective throughput in cache-aided networks. In particular, the effective throughput is defined by splitting the transmission costs and can be viewed as the number of equivalent cache hits in each user's buffer. It has been proved that the achievable domain of effective throughputs is a convex set and can be totally characterized by its boundary in the positive orthant. For (B, N, P)-Caching with two users, both theoretical analysis and simulation results have demonstrated that the achievable domain under UPAF policies is a polygon. A noncooperative game has been formulated to investigate Nash equilibria between the two users. It has been proved that the noncooperative game has PSNEs if user preferences are similar. A low-complexity algorithm has been proposed to provide a PSNE for the noncooperative game with high probability. In addition, an effective throughput allocation scheme has been given based on a cooperative game. For (B, N, P)-Caching in the general multiuser case, a feasible UPAF policy has also been proposed to organize user cooperation. It has also been shown that user cooperation can bring significant caching gains and the achievable domain of effective throughputs expands with the increase of the buffer size.
Users with more concentrated preferences can obtain higher effective throughputs. Significant future topics include games for (B, N, P)-Caching with multiple users, practical user preference analysis based on real data, and the analysis of effective throughput in cache-aided D2D networks and heterogeneous networks.
